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BETWEEN STATUTE AND CONTRACT: WHO IS A WORKER? 
 
Professor Alan Bogg and Professor Michael Ford QC 
University of Bristol 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Uber BV v Aslam [2018] EWCA Civ 2748; 
[2019] I.R.L.R. 257 is the latest attempt to clarify what exactly is meant by ‘worker’. 
UK law now confers many labour rights on ‘workers’, including entitlements to the 
national minimum wage and limitations on working time. This statutory concept 
embraces employees at common law but extends to a wider category, usually 
referred to as ‘limb (b) workers’. They are defined as self-employed individuals who 
work under a contract “whereby the individual undertakes to perform personally 
any work or service for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of 
that contract that of a client or customer of any business undertaking carried on by 
that individual“ (see e.g. s.230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and the 
cognate definition in s.54(3) of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998). The 
persistent legal issue, highlighted by Uber, is establishing to what extent written 
contractual terms, typically drafted by “armies of lawyers” (Consistent Group v 
Kalwak [2007] I.R.L.R 560 per Elias J at [51]), can effectively circumscribe the 
boundaries of relational status and oust statutory protections. 
 
The written documentation in Uber was detailed and complex. Drivers pick up 
passengers via an app owned by Uber. The app confirms the booking, sets a route, 
calculates the fare, receives the payment and generates an ‘invoice’ recording the 
trip. There is a written contract between the passenger and Uber about the ‘booking 
services’, denying Uber is anything other than a technology platform and asserting 
Uber is an agent of the drivers. Separate detailed and elaborate terms exist between 
Uber’s head company, Uber BV, and those who provide the transport, described in 
2013 as ‘Partners’ and in 2015 as ‘Customers’. According to these, Uber is no more 
than a ‘tool’ connecting passengers and drivers; and it does not itself provide 
transportation services or control the drivers. In sum, if the written documentation is 
treated as determinative, when providing transport the drivers are not working ‘for’ 
Uber, which is a mere agent. If that is so, they would seem to be outside the scope of 
the limb (b) category and its panoply of statutory protections. 
 
The leading authority on limb (b) worker is now the UKSC judgment in Clyde & Co 
LLP v Bates van Winkelhof [2014] UKSC 32; [2014] I.C.R. 730. According to Lady Hale, 
while there is no “single key with which to unlock the words of the statute” and no 
substitute for applying the statutory wording, the degree to which the individual is 
integrated into the putative employer’s undertaking will often be highly relevant 
(Bates at [37]-[39], citing Maurice Kay LJ in HMG v Westwood [2012] EWCA Civ 1005; 
[2013] I.C.R. 415 at [19]). The application of this test to the complex contractual 
arrangements in Uber was filtered through the principles of Autoclenz v Belcher [2011] 
UKSC 41; [2011] I.C.R. 1157. According to Lord Clarke in Autoclenz, the critical 
question is to ascertain “what was the true agreement between the parties.” (at [29]). 
This enquiry was to take place within the context of the “relative bargaining power 
of the parties”, so that the “true agreement” was to be “gleaned from all the 
circumstances of the case, of which the written agreement is only a part” (at [35]). 
For the majority in Uber (Sir Terence Etherton MR and Bean LJ), the drivers were 
workers because the reality was that they were working ‘for’ Uber, not the other way 
round. By contrast, Underhill LJ, held that Autoclenz provided no basis for 
disregarding written terms because those terms were not necessarily inconsistent 
with the facts on the ground. The pivot of disagreement in Uber was thus the 
application of Autoclenz in ‘worker’ cases. 
 
Uber highlights the uncertain effect of Autoclenz where the discrepancy between 
written terms and factual circumstances is less palpable than it was in Autoclenz 
itself. There, written contracts labelled car valeters as self-employed and contained 
terms designed to deny certain essential elements of employee status, such as 
‘personal service’ and ‘mutuality of obligation’. In fact, however, the valeteers were 
under the control of Autoclenz and were required to turn up for work each day. In 
holding that tribunals and courts were entitled to disregard the written 
documentation, Lord Clarke’s judgment reached beyond employment law to the 
legal principles on ‘shams’ and ‘pretences’ in tax and tenancies. In so doing, 
Autoclenz went beyond the narrow ‘sham’ doctrine based on a common intention of 
the parties to create a false impression (Snook v London and West Riding Investments 
Ltd [1967] 2 Q.B. 786). A Snook sham is usually absent in employment cases because 
typically one party alone – the employer – has effective control over the drafting of 
the contractual documentation. 
 
The Master of the Rolls and Bean LJ summarised the effect of Autoclenz as meaning 
that “the court may disregard the terms of any documents generated by the 
employer which do not reflect the reality of what is occurring on the ground” (at 
[66]). In contrast to Uber’s characterisation of the agreements as mere licences to use 
the app, the reality was of a personal work contract between the driver and Uber 
once the driver accepted a request to pick up a passenger, in which Uber was not the 
driver’s client or customer (at [74]-[82]). The background regulatory regime, the 
control Uber exercised over drivers, and other factors all reinforced the conclusion 
that the drivers were workers providing services ‘for’ Uber within the meaning of 
the statutory concept (at [87]-[97]). 
 
By contrast, Underhill LJ saw Autoclenz as having a more restricted function: it only 
enabled a tribunal to disregard terms of a written contract with an employee or 
worker which are “inconsistent with the true agreement”, with the agreement to be 
gleaned from the facts and the written contract (at [119]). It did not apply where the 
written terms were consistent with how the parties worked in practice (at [120]). 
Contrary to the findings of the employment tribunal (ET), the facts on the ground 
were entirely consistent with drivers contracting with the passengers through the 
agency of Uber, just as in the case of a traditional mini-cab firm (at [145]-[149]). For 
Underhill LJ, the descriptor in the contractual documents that Uber was an agent, 
acting as intermediary to connect drivers and passengers (at [112]-[113]), was not 
inconsistent with the reality (at [145]-[147]).  
 
It is important to note that this agency characterisation was not simply establishing 
contractual rights which could then be measured against the facts - that would be the 
case, for example, if the contracts asserted that the worker was not subject to the 
control of the other party, which could then be undermined by a practice of 
subordination, supporting the existence of contractual right to control the execution 
of the work. This was similar to the situation in Autoclenz; but Uber is a far more 
difficult case. The agency characterisation was attempting to create a legal 
classification of the relationship; it is but one small step away from giving a label to 
the relationship, which the courts have long held is insufficient to establish its legal 
identity (Street v Mountford [1985] A.C. 809). Such a clause is inevitably less 
vulnerable to contradiction by the ‘facts’ on the ground because it implies less about 
those facts. 
 
Both the majority and minority saw Autoclenz as mandating an inquiry into the ‘true 
agreement’ or ‘actual agreement’. For the majority, priority was given to the factual 
arrangements, with the written documents reduced to relevant evidence (at [73]), 
whereas for Underhill LJ the written terms provided the reality of the agreement, 
only to be disregarded when inconsistent with practice (at [120]). What judges see as 
‘real’ depends on the type of legal prism through which they view the arrangements: 
for Underhill LJ the written documents are in the foreground, whereas for the 
majority they are part of a wider canvass. The difference between these approaches 
is perhaps accounted for by the fact that the majority gave greater prominence to the 
protective statutory context to the enquiry: the statute was its legal prism (at [73]).  
 
The ‘contractual’ reading of Autoclenz, in which the focus is on the ‘true agreement’, 
was highly influential in Uber. We think it was given undue emphasis. First, 
Autoclenz was an ‘easy’ case because there was ample evidence that neither party 
credibly regarded the offending terms, which were there simply to give an 
impression of genuine self-employment, as generating real contractual obligations. 
In Uber, by contrast, the configuration of the multipartite arrangements as an agency 
relationship was simply not amenable to contradiction by the working arrangements 
in the same way. In these circumstances, the ‘true agreement’ approach is liable to 
unpredictability in its application, as reflected in the divergence in the Court of 
Appeal as to the importance accorded to the written terms. In hard cases like Uber, 
the metaphysics of the ‘true agreement’ is an unreliable touchstone because, as Lord 
Hoffmann once astutely observed, “something may be real for one purpose but not 
for another” (MacNiven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] 
UKHL 6; [2003] 1 A.C. 311 at [40]). 
 
Secondly, it may also be relevant that Autoclenz was focused on whether the car 
valeters were employees, as were the cases of Consistent Group v Kalwak [2008] 
EWCA Civ 430; [2008] I.R.L.R 505 and Protectacoat Firthglow v Szilagyi [2009] EWCA 
Civ 98; [2009] I.C.R. 835, upon which Lord Clarke also relied. In relation to 
employees, the relevant statutory provisions adopt the contract of service, a 
subsisting common law category whose identity is constituted by its core contractual 
obligations, such as personal service, a wage-work bargain, and so forth. It is 
natural, therefore, to identify the true contractual obligations as a prelude to 
characterising the identity of the contract. By contrast, limb (b) worker is an 
exclusively statutory category. In applying that test, it may be mistaken to draw 
analogies with authorities on contacts of employment, such as Quashie v Stringfellow 
Restaurants [2012] EWCA Civ 1735; [2013] I.R.L.R. 99 and Cheng Yuen v Royal Hong 
Kong Golf Club [1998] I.C.R. 131, as did counsel for Uber (Uber at [67]-[69]). This 
reflects a mistaken elision of the categories of employee and limb (b) worker, which 
ought to be kept distinct. The limb (b) worker is a statutory category, and the ‘true 
agreement’ approach obscures the central role of the statutory purpose in applying 
the criteria to work arrangements. 
 
Is ‘contractual’ Autoclenz the only game in town? There were in fact two distinct 
streams to the pre-Autoclenz case-law, not one. Though the streams are partially 
confluent, their elision causes confusion in hard cases such as Uber. Given the 
statutory context to limb (b) worker cases, ‘statutory’ Autoclenz is a better approach 
than its ‘contractual’ counterpart. 
 
This ‘statutory’ Autoclenz approach is reflected in the line of tax cases developing a 
‘purposive’ construction of fiscal legislation (on the tax cases within the context of 
Autoclenz, see E. Simpson, ‘Sham and Purposive Statutory Construction’ in E. 
Simpson and M. Stewart, Sham Transactions (2013)). Its origin is often attributed to 
the decision of the House of Lords in WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
[1982] A.C. 300. The analysis offered by Lord Nicholls in Barclays Mercantile Business 
Finance Limited v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51; [2005] 1 A.C. 684 continues to identify its 
basic character: 
 
“[t]he essence of the new approach was to give the statutory provision a purposive 
construction in order to determine the nature of the transaction to which it was 
intended to apply and then to decide whether the actual transaction…answered to 
the statutory description” (at [32]). 
 
It is crystallised in Mr Justice Ribeiro’s now canonical formula that “the ultimate 
question is whether the relevant statutory provisions, construed purposively, were 
intended to apply to the transaction, viewed realistically” (Collector of Stamp Revenue 
v Arrowtown [2003] HKFCA 46 at [35], cited by Lord Nicholls in Barclays Mercantile 
Business Finance Limited v Mawson at [36]). 
 
The difference between the statutory and contractual approaches is illustrated by 
one of the tenancy cases on which Lord Clarke relied in Autoclenz, Bankway Properties 
Ltd v Pensfold-Dunsford [2001] EWCA Civ 528; [2001] W.L.R. 1369. A rent increase 
clause was inserted into a tenancy agreement in order to trigger a compulsory 
statutory ground for possession: it was ‘real’ in the sense that the landlord intended 
to rely on it. In holding that the clause was an impermissible attempt to contract out 
of the protective legislation, Arden LJ based on her analysis primarily on statutory 
construction, and the court’s role “to give effect to the intention of Parliament as 
expressed in the words that it has used.” (at [49]). She contrasted her approach, 
which is closely aligned with the ‘purposive’ statutory construction in the Ramsay 
cases, with that of Pill LJ (at [58]), who preferred “an analysis of the terms of the 
contract” (at [66]). He held the rent clause was not part of the true agreement 
because it was repugnant to the overarching commercial purpose, which was to 
enter into a statutorily protected assured tenancy. We think that Pill LJ’s approach 
has an air of artificiality and metaphysical obscurity, particularly in circumstances 
where the enforceability of the term was in fact critical to the employer’s plan to 
evade a protective statute. In this respect, Arden LJ rightly emphasised the intention 
of Parliament, not the intention of the contracting parties, in identifying the legal nub 
of the issue. It is significant that Lord Clarke in Autoclenz referred approvingly to 
Arden LJ’s judgment in Bankway as exemplifying an approach that “relevant 
contractual provisions were not effective to avoid a particular statutory result” (at 
[23]-[24]). He also described his own approach as ‘purposive’ (at [35]), terminology 
characteristic of the ‘statutory’ approach. 
 
We consider that the purposive statutory construction approach is a better approach 
to adopt in hard limb (b) worker cases such as Uber. First, the legislative background 
points to a wide, inclusive concept of ‘worker’, which should not be defeated by 
labyrinthine written contracts. The limb (b) category was intended by Parliament to 
apply to fundamental social rights, such as the national minimum wage and 
working time, and was enacted in the context of statutes which prohibit contracting 
out or even include presumptions of inclusion (see e.g. ss. 28, 49 NMWA). The 
progenitors of the domestic concept equally adopted wide, inclusive terminology 
(see s.25 of the Truck Act 1831, s.10 of the Employers and Workmen Act 1875, s.2 
Truck Amendment Act 1887). Sometimes the statute is underwritten by the EU 
concept of ‘worker’, such as in the case of the Working Time Regulations 1998 at 
issue in Uber, where the CJEU sees through legal or contractual form and gives 
overriding emphasis to whether the individual is under the direction of the 
employer, does not share its risks and forms an integral part of its undertaking (see 
Kunsten v Staat der Nederlanden (Case C-413/13) EU:C:2014:2411; [2015] All E.R. (EC) 
387 at [33]-[36]).  
 
Secondly, the policy considerations which led the Ramsay line of authorities to look 
beyond apparently ‘genuine’ transactions are equally apposite here. A narrow focus 
on whether each individual term or transaction was ‘real’, in the sense that it is not 
contradicted by the facts of the relationship, deflects attention from the overarching 
statutory purpose to limb (b). In contrast to Autoclenz, Uber involves elaborate 
multipartite contractual arrangements. The statutory approach would require the 
court to step back and examine the overall relationship between drivers and Uber in 
the round, rather than forensically scrutinising discrete elements within it to see if 
they are ‘real’. This also resolves the knotty issue of how far Autoclenz permits courts 
to disregard the written terms in the contract between Uber and the passengers. The 
task of classification gives priority to the statutory purpose, not how Uber classifies 
the web of legal relationships in its written documentation. On that approach, an 
individual driver can be working ‘for’ Uber, regardless of whether Uber is 
characterised as an agent in the contractual documents, where the other factors 
relevant to the statutory test, such as integration and control, support that 
characterisation. Treating ‘working for’ as an exclusionary barrier, as Underhill LJ 
appears to do, would subvert the inclusionary statutory purpose of limb (b) in 
multipartite situations. 
 
On the purposive statutory approach it is therefore beside the point for Underhill LJ 
to argue for caution lest “the Courts seek to fashion a common law route to affording 
protection to Uber drivers and others in the same position’” and to propose that this 
is “a classic area for legislative intervention” (at [164]-[166]). Arden LJ’s rejoinder in 
Bankway to similar concerns about the appropriate constitutional limits of 
adjudication is equally powerful in Uber. Parliament has already intervened, through 
the limb (b) category and statutory employment rights, and it is the constitutional 
duty of the court to apply the words of the statute purposively and realistically to 
work arrangements in favour of inclusion. This fits with the constitutional duty of 
the court to support Parliament by ensuring that statutory employment rights are 
enforced effectively (UNISON v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51; [2017] 3 W.L.R. 409). 
In applying limb (b) to work arrangements, this should not be done in a formalistic 
way. The limb (b) definition should be applied as a composite formula, determining 
whether Parliament intended these work arrangements, characterised by a high 
degree of control and integration, to be included within the protective category. That 
is precisely what the ET did. 
 
Autoclenz is now at a crossroads. ACL Davies has argued that it would be better to 
“acknowledge the role being played by the statutory regime of protection for 
employees and workers” in Autoclenz (A.C.L. Davies, ‘Employment Law’ in E. 
Simpson and M. Stewart, Sham Transactions (2013) at p.187). Uber provides an 
opportunity to take this step. This purposive approach is particularly apt for limb (b) 
workers. To accept the written characterisation of the relationship unless it 
contradicted by practice detracts from the protective and inclusionary purpose of the 
statute. A focus on the statutory purpose avoids the tricky metaphysics of hunting 
for the ‘true’ or ‘real’ agreement in hard cases like Uber. This would leave Snook and 
‘contractual’ Autoclenz to be used in more overt cases of contract manipulation, 
where the language of ‘sham’ and ‘pretence’ is more apposite. ‘Statutory’ Autoclenz 
can then be directed at the difficult boundary problems in multipartite cases like 
Uber, where there is no obvious discrepancy between the written contracts and the 
facts on the ground. Uber thus offers an important opportunity for the UKSC to 
clarify the distinctive ambits of ‘contractual’ and ‘statutory’ Autoclenz, and to give 
the purposive ‘statutory’ dimension of Autoclenz a more prominent role. 
 
 
 
